The Daily Clarity

Pakistan – a country under siege

The map above should be front and center on every desk in the US State Department. It may help the budding US diplomat (or remind an experienced one)  how besieged the Pakistani government in Islamabad feels, and the potential consequences of any failure of US policy in the region. The Pakistani government faces demands  from Kashmiri nationalists to the North East, have ceded control to the Taliban in the Swat Valley, face potential loss of control of the whole North-West Frontier, are losing the battles in many regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, face independence pressure from Baluchistan, have the volatile regions of Helmand and Kandahar in Afghanistan to their West to contend with, and that is only the abridged highlights  The politicians and Generals in Washington, DC must feel safe and secure, by comparison. On the  regional map (below), one can add in the complexities of the broader geopolitical landscape Pakistan  faces, and begin to understand the magnitude of the challenges besieging Pakistan.

Pakistan sits sandwiched on a traditional political fault line between Iran, Afghanistan, China, and its nemesis, India to its East. Just beyond its northern borders lie the ‘stan‘ states of the Former Soviet Union. We have reported before of  the challenges in the concept of Pakistan nationalism, add in the pressure caused by its geographic location, and one can see why Pakistan is both a massive opportunity and a time-bomb of a risk for the West. One also has to factor in the rather blunt diplomatic tools that the Western nations have traditionally used in the area. For example, there appears to be substantive evidence to show that the British Intelligence Services are providing logistical and financial support to the nationalists in the  Baluchistan region, this apparently so as to provide a buffer to Iran with a people that would  then owe a debt of gratitude to Britain. It is a risk that increasing the pressure on IsLamabad  may well see its failure as a state as opposed to increasing the influence of or dependence on the West. Britain’s Foreign Minister, Miliband,  on a recent trip to the region made a great deal of noise about resolving the Kashmir dispute, which caused consternation in both New Delhi and Islamabad who would prefer that their erstwhile colonial power kept their opinions to themselves unless asked. The Western powers are fiddling, but not always with enough finesse for a Central Asian’s mind, and the cooperation as a result, is not always whole-hearted.

The debate by commentators on this area is often reduced to talk about the great powers, those being the US, Russia and China, all jockeying for strategic advantage. This is a vast oversimplificationof the true regional dynamics. There is the growing influence of Iran spreading North, with common language sets (Farsi and Dari) and ethnicity with many in Afghanistan, as much a concern to its Northern neighbors as it is in the South in Israel and Lebanon. There are the tribal groupings across the region such as the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch and others. These often have stronger tribal allegiances than a nominal nationalism marked by arbitrary borders drawn by foreign powers. In fact, Several of these tribes are fighting separatist/nationalistic insurgencies striving  for self-governance away from what they see as failed central governments. In addition, there are Sunni-Shia factions and spats that add additional dimensions of complexity. There are also Hindu- Sikh minorities who are vehemently opposed to a resurgent Taliban given the violence visited on them, and the fact that  the Hindus were forced to wear yellow badges to identify themselves under the Taliban reign. There is far more at play here than some proxy battles for influence by the great powers. There is a highly volatile mixing pot of religion, tribes, sects and nationalists that are showing no signs of mixing, but rather increasing a potential for dangerous implosion. How bad are the prospects in Pakistan? To cite a recent article in the Economist, many diplomats are close to despair:

“Foreign diplomats in Islamabad sound increasingly despondent. One says: “The more effort we’ve put into this place, the worse it’s got.” The rate at which Mr Musharraf’s few achievements have crumbled to dust is shocking. Bolstering the economy, mismanaged by Mr Sharif, was one. An ambitious package of local government reforms, establishing elected mayors to run the district-level bureaucracy, was another. In NWFP this system, perhaps unfairly, has been blamed for ushering in the Taliban, and is now being hobbled. Other provinces are expected to do likewise. More depressing is the demise of Mr Musharraf’s biggest triumph, a detente with India. A bilateral peace process, launched in 2004 by Mr Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee, India’s then prime minister, had brought the two countries closer than at any time in their painful history. Even a settlement of the dispute over divided Kashmir seemed possible. But in 2007 Mr Musharraf’s attention wandered to crushing his democratic opponents, and the initiative drifted. In November, after the attacks in Mumbai in which over 170 were killed, India put it on hold.”

The US faces unpalatable diplomatic choices in the region, and no chance of a decisive military victory given the constantly shifting sands of allegiances. The US and its NATO allies could withdraw, as some politicians recommend.  Ron Paul, a past US Presidential candidate,  suggested in a recent interview that withdrawal should be considered a viable policy option given economic conditions and the political morass in the region. However, withdrawal may well be a nightmare scenario.  It would be  probable that the region could rapidly implode, with Afghanistan falling to the Taliban, Pakistan fracturing to Islamic insurgent control,  and Iran running harassment for Western interests wherever it is able. If the US is to succeed in the region, even though “success” has yet to be defined in any pragmatic terms, it needs to be prepared for long term engagement. Much of  the challenge falls on the shoulders of the new US Envoy in the area, Richard Holbrooke. It will be no easy task for him, Secretary of State Clinton, or the rest of the Obama Administration.  The Economist article succinctly outlines the challenge ahead of him:

“His  (Holbrooke’s) brief is certainly daunting. Unless Pakistan’s army can be persuaded to undergo a “strategic renaissance”, in the phrase of Lieut-General Talat Masood, a Pakistani military pundit, it may be unwilling or unable to deny the use of its north-west frontier to the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. It will not, in a month of Fridays, be bulldozed into complying with America’s demands. “You can’t insult a country into co-operation,” says General Masood. Besides stern words, Pakistan’s army will therefore require even more American money and equipment, especially counter-insurgency kit, such as helicopters and night-vision gear, which it has long demanded. It will also require America to allay the army’s fear of encirclement by a pro-India regime in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, America needs to stand up for Pakistan’s democratic leaders, who are on its side. Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif both say they want peace with India and an end to ruinous militancy. Neither is a friend to the army.” Finally, America and NATO must convince the Pakistanis that they mean to stick it out in Afghanistan until the fledgling state can stand up for itself. Some ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence service) officers concede that NATO will remain in Afghanistan longer than the army had expected (“maybe another 15 to 20 years”). But none seems to believe it can stabilise the place; and this remains NATO’s improbable task. Without better help from Pakistan, it may not succeed. But even with this help, as the Pakistanis know, NATO may fail.”

Afghanistan and Pakistan’s stability are intrinsically linked and inter-dependant, as the maps clearly indicate. What would a stable Afghanistan look like, and is it a reasonable objective for the US to target?  Afghanistan has no democratic heritage to fall back on at times of national doubt.  Afghanistan’s current (and first ever) democratic government has been widely-judged as  ineffective, self-interested, and allegedly riddled with corruption. Only yesterday, a nasty personal spat  about constitutional validity and personal integrity between the Afghan President Karzai and his Deputy interupted the National Assembly debate, and only after several hours of  bitter arguments  were normal proceedings resumed. This does not augur well for a democratic Afghan government. The elections have been delayed until August this year from a May target due to security concerns. Afghanistan has a long complex history that impacts its current reality, tand hat also  influences Pakistan State efficiency. For example, there is a rumor emerging that the Afghans want to meld the new model of a democratic government with a  twist of their historic royalty, a reminder that in Afghanistan, things rarely change, and if they do, never quickly. This  report shows how deep some of the historic loyalties run :

“Approximately four hundred people representing various tribal groups of Afghanistancame in full force to give their support to the presidential candidacy of charismatic Prince Abdul Ali Seraj.  Prince Ali Serajis a well known figure in Afghanistan not only because he is a direct descendant of nine kings but also because of his successful businesses in the country prior to the Russian invasion.  Prince Ali Seraj who is a grandson of King Habibullah and nephew of King Amamullahhad a great life of leisure in Afghanistan until the communists came, killed President Daud Khan, tortured the citizens and put the family on house arrest.”

Afghanistan influences aside, Pakistan is a pressure cooker in its own right, with some elements of the volatile mix of its own making, but many parts it cannot directly control. It is is in these areas that the US needs to focus its support and efforts. The US focus needs to be laser-like and not distracted by regional ‘noise’ on other issues. The dangers of a state failure in Pakistan could be dire. While the world focuses on the nuclear ambitions of Iran, for example, Pakistan already has nuclear weapons. While Israel argues that the potential for Iran to go nuclear is the greatest existential threat to world peace, we  differ with that conclusion. It is a danger, but the situation in and around Pakistan is equally as critical. The potential for an implosion in Pakistan, combined with a resurgent Taliban-Al Qaeda  ready to take the helm, strikes us as a highly dangerous situation that should focus the US concentration. The US is placing a great deal of responsibility on the shoulder of its Envoy Holbrooke. We hope he is up to the task and should be  given his experience, but the regions history plays against any easy outcome. President Obama has promised his new regional policy will be ready in the summer of this year, and it will be one of the most interesting releases for many commentators. Hopefully, the US hegemonyof the recent past that so annoyed the Pakistanis, will be balanced with a more complete policy approach including incentives not sanctions. Pakistan needs support and guiding in the direction of  national consolidation, as it forms a critical lynch pin for regional stability. If the Pakistan state fails, so do many of the US objectives in region – a point we are sure is not lost on the Obama Administration.