What Obama didn’t say about the mire in Afghanistan
What Obama did not say about Afghanistan in his speech, is as telling as what he did say. There are many reasons for the pervasive and collective negativism about US prospects in Afghanistan, not least of which is identifying what conditions could even facilitate an exit strategy. Every scenario that one can play out sees the US increasingly mired in a seemingly indecisive conflict for a term as yet unlimited. While the abbreviation of Afpak as linguistic symbol for a regional complexity such as the flowing on of the Taliban issues into FATA, Frontier Territories, and into Pakistan is a trite descriptor; the solutions and strategies that need to be adopted differ in each dependent on societal need. At a macro level, the objective remains consistent – civil security, economic improvements, human rights protection, stable governance, fair and independent judicial functions – the regional, religious, and secular concerns vary in nuance campaign by campaign. Pakistan is barely a country in any conventional sense of a common definition of nationhood, as we have detailed before. The dangers there are many and varied. However, despite the negativism from the likes of a politicking Petraeus, a recognizable national entity can, through encouragement and coercion, be coaxed into existence. While Pakistan’s issues will continue long after the days of the current Presidency, there is at least a prospect for achievable and measurable outcomes. The same cannot be said, at this stage, for Afghanistan.
It is in Afghanistan that we see the potential for a US legacy failure. President Obama should, both a political and a strategic imperative, extricate himself from this particular mire as quickly as possible. Obama’s recent ‘Muslim World’ outreach speech (cringe worthy phrase that it is), his words about Afghanistan were telling. His phrases rang of frustration on the subject, ”…Now, make no mistake: We do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We see no military — we seek no military bases there. It is agonizing for America to lose our young men and women. It is costly and politically difficult to continue this conflict. We would gladly bring every single one of our troops home if we could be confident that there were not violent extremists in Afghanistan and now Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans as they possibly can. But that is not yet the case.” It is hard to imagine a scenario, where this would ever be the case. Afghanistan is potentially the stone that could blunt the blade of the Obama Presidency, but in his frustration, Obama is far from alone. NATO is sour about the current Afghanistan misadventures too:
It would be hard to imagine a more frustrating theater of war. Afghanistan is a challenging country – difficult terrain, long vulnerable supply routes, a suspicious tribal populace, a questionable government, and with porous borders. Add to this the difficult geopolitical and diplomatic landscape, a fractured NATO chain of command, a certain resistance to listen by the likes of Petraeus, and perhaps it can be seen why the commitment to the war in Afghanistan in faltering. The NATO chain of command is riddled with what are called “National Caveats.” These are the specific rules of conduct that NATO member countries prescribe for their specific troops as a precondition of engagement. The rules are highly variable. Some countries say their troops can only engage in conflict in the case of self-defense, others that they cannot fight to protect the troops of other select nominated countries. It is a logistical and command nightmare. – NATO negative on Afghanistan prospects | The Daily Clarity.
There is also a constant public adjusting of what we should judge to be a ‘successful’ outcome in Afghanistan. The revised President Obama policy towards Afghanistan is still a little too opaque of measurement for our liking. What would define this success, and what is the exit strategy are still not adequately delineated. Not long ago, The Brookings Institute, an independent policy think tank, wrote a cautionary policy analysis that deserves revisiting. The memo, written by Vanda Felbab-Brown, can be found in its original form here, Brookings Memo. The Brookings’ memo is full of helpful advice as to what Obama should do at a tactical level. However, it lacks what virtually every other analysis written about Afghanistan does, what would ‘victory’ in Afghanistan mean? There appears no viable outcome that would facilitate a victory celebration point, and that would facilitate a US exit. Many believe there is little for Obama to gain in Afghanistan, and much for him to lose. The Independent’s Robert Fisk cut Obama no slack on his comments on Obama’s speech
Over and again, one kept saying to oneself: Obama …hasn’t mentioned Afghanistan – and then he did (“we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan… we will gladly bring every one of our troops home”). When he started talking about the “coalition of 46 countries” in Afghanistan – a very dodgy statistic – he began to sound like his predecessor… For a man who is sending thousands more US troops into Afghanistan – a certain disaster-to-come in the eyes of Arabs and Westerners – there was something brazen about all this. – Robert Fisk: Words that could heal wounds of centuries – Robert Fisk, Commentators – The Independent.
Obama decided that fresh blood was what was required to head his Afghan campaign, and so appointed US Army Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal to bring new thinking to the zone. McChrystal’s early analysis should give Obama pause. His fresh thinking seems little more than a condemnation of tactics to date, and a less than hopeful scenario for the immediate future.
Nato’s next commander in Afghanistan warned yesterday that the West could lose the war against the Taleban if it fails to gain the support of the Afghan people.
In a blunt assessment of the mission, US Army Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal predicted increasing casualties as President Obama’s surge of troops progresses over the summer.
Civilian deaths in Afghanistan, especially from US airstrikes launched from unmanned drones, have already inflamed anti-American sentiment in parts of the country.
“How we conduct operations is vital to success. This is a critical point. It may be the critical point. This is a struggle for the support of the Afghan people,” General McChrystal told the Senate Armed Forces Committee during his confirmation hearing.
“Our willingness to operate in ways that minimise casualties or damage — even when doing so makes our task more difficult — is essential to our credibility.”- Nato commander Stanley McChrystal: ‘We must gain support of Afghans’ – Times Online.
Some of the policy analysts have been sketching out possible scenarios in the region, and how they might play out more broadly. For example, Tom Barnett, in a recent article postulates that if Israel pursues preemptive strikes against Iran, the knock on effect of Iranian reprisals will more deeply mire the US in both Afghanistan and Iran. While we may not agree with every nuance of Tom’s analysis nor the certainty of the outcome, his end conclusion remains true. Regardless of whether the situation remains status quo or escalates through regional aggression as Tom suggests, the prospects for an early, clean or inexpensive exit from Afghanistan looks highly unlikely.
If Netanyahu were to pull the trigger, Tehran would retaliate with both barrels — as in Hamas and Hezbollah. That would kill any two-state solution right there for Obama’s entire first term, something Netanyahu would likely welcome as a two-birds-with-one-stone bonus. Stipulating that any direct kinetic response out of Iran against Israel would be a serious wild card, the more prosaic fall-out (pun intended) would be this: Iran would radically speed up its pursuit of nuclear weaponry, as would both Turkey and Saudi Arabia (who logically are colluding on this goal already). Toss in Egypt and the UAE as likely follow-ups.
In that scary pathway, the Saudis could well choose to reignite a proxy war (Saudi-backed Sunni vs. Iranian-backed Shia) within Iraq as a way of tying down Tehran somewhat (along with a generous buyout of wavering Iranian ally Syria). In this scenario, it really wouldn’t matter whether or not Ahmadinejad won re-election next week, because a “righteously” angered Iran would be forced to ratchet up its anti-American efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, shredding Obama wind-down goals in the process and setting him up for a tough re-election battle in 2012
Obama Cairo Speech Analysis – Obama Speech to Muslim World – Esquire.
Obama seems to be pegging his hopes of a resolution to the Afghanistan problem on stable governance and civil society improvements. To his credit, he is changing the mix of the forces to be deployed, with a greater focus on reconstruction and infrastructure resources, rather than a pure focus on the fighting man. However, his efforts involves a requirement for stable governance, and in that he is more challenged. A stable democracy in Afghanistan is somewhat unknown there, and Afghan President Karzai seems like an unlikely candidate to achieve this objective. Afghanistan also sits on a power fault line with the capacity for plate shifts that could settle things far more even than Karzai’s fiddlings in Kabul.
The debate by commentators on this area is often reduced to talk about the great powers, those being the US, Russia and China, all jockeying for strategic advantage. This is a vast oversimplification of the true regional dynamics. There is the growing influence of Iran spreading North, with common language sets (Farsi and Dari) and ethnicity with many in Afghanistan… There are the tribal groupings across the region such as the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak, Turkmen, Baloch and others. These often have stronger tribal allegiances, than a nominal nationalism marked by arbitrary borders drawn by foreign powers. In fact, Several of these tribes are fighting separatist/nationalistic insurgencies striving for self-governance away from what they see as failed central governments. In addition, there are Sunni-Shia factions and spats that add additional dimensions of complexity. There are also Hindu- Sikh minorities who are vehemently opposed to a resurgent Taliban given the violence visited on them…under the Taliban reign. There is far more at play here than some proxy battles for influence by the great powers. There is a highly volatile mixing pot of religion, tribes, sects and nationalists that are showing no signs of mixing, but rather increasing a potential for dangerous implosion- Obama’s war – the complexities of Afpak | The Daily Clarity.
So what is Obama’s definition of success, and what will be the conditions on the ground that will trigger him to say US exit is suddenly practical and achievable? It is a difficult scenario to envisage. The mere presence of foreign troops incites the Afghans,so only withdrawal or political compromise can end possibly end insurgent conflict. However, as soon as Obama withdraws then the stage is set for the Taliban to retake power, so the circle would repeat. Thus it becomes apparent the only solution for Afghanistan lies with the Afghans themselves. Obama’s only hope in Afghanistan is to create a blanket of security, economic prosperity and social equality against which as a backdrop, the Afghan people can chart its own course.
If Obama can change the focus to preventing civilian casualties rather than accepting them as collateral cost, then the method of this war would change. This objective would negate the use of artillery and unmanned drones. It would put the emphasis on training Afghan troops mobility and strike capabilities, and beefing up the civilian security services. If the objective became economic prosperity and civilian compliance with the state, one would focus not on roadblocks and patrols, but on education and infrastructure. It is only by denying the Taliban a reason for existing as a military force with any populist support, that the war in Afghanistan can be won. It is not with an army on offense, but by freeing a nation from unrest, that the road to victory lies.
Any ‘victory’ also requires acceptance of the fact that a broad coalition Afghan government, including Taliban representation, is probably the best outcome that Obama might hope for. The US has been challenged recently in accepting such realities, such as the democratically elected Hamas government in the Gaza, and the coalition government still including Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite the March 14 bloc victory. A Coalition including the Taliban is a probable reality in Afghanistan, and it is a reality that Obama will need to countenance more quickly than he has recognized the requirement to engage with Hamas and Hezbollah.
