The Daily Clarity

Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) Revisited: Vietnam-Era Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan

The article is written by guest contributor Andrew C. Katen who is a freelance foreign affairs writer and geopolitical analyst.

The U.S. Marine Corps’ recently-launched operation in the Helmand Valley – billed as “the first large-scale test of the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan”[1] – actually represents the re-application of a strategy previously employed with mixed success in Vietnam (and again in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004). The idea of “embedding” U.S. troops in villages – to build relations with the local populace, train militias, gather intelligence, and deprive insurgents of vital supplies and geography – has its roots in the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program implemented in the northern provinces of South Vietnam in 1965.[2] Built upon the lessons of earlier counterinsurgency campaigns there (i.e., the British Strategic Hamlet Program and American special forces-led Civilian Irregular Defense Groups),[3] CAP sought to balance the inappropriate war-of-attrition strategy favored by conventional military leaders with the “small wars” doctrine historically understood and practiced by the Marine Corps.[4]

Where it was tried CAP yielded some successes – rather than engaging in hit-or-miss carpet bombing campaigns or seek-and-destroy missions, the Marines-led program addressed the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese population, a cornerstone for defeating Maoist insurgency at the grassroots level. Ultimately, however, the program was folded into the United States’ larger political defeat in Southeast Asia. This reality is important to understand given the application of “CAP 3.0” to accomplish similar objectives in Afghanistan. Regardless of the counterinsurgency successes of Marines “on the ground” in the Helmand Valley, the program will likely become a casualty of: nebulous and conflicting larger U.S. policies for Central Asia; the historic political instability of a country and region whose governance is divided among multiple competing factions with shifting alliances; and the reality that the insurgency is no doubt exacerbated – and, at least in part, motivated – by the occupation of Afghanistan by a foreign power (perceived as irreligious infidels). Moreover – and regardless of the political context to which it is applied – a counterinsurgency program like CAP requires a lengthy and unwavering commitment to maintain an around-the-clock presence by U.S. soldiers in enemy territory, for long periods of time and often far outside the umbrella of immediate U.S. artillery or air support – a promise that will be very difficult to deliver quickly or without significant casualties.

The original CAP program in Vietnam was a component of the larger pacification effort advanced by General Abrams’ “One War” approach: utilizing conventional warfare to fight large-scale battles, while at the same time addressing the underlying political element of the insurgency by contributing to rural development, improved infrastructure, and local security.[5] CAP had seven major goals for villages in its region: to protect public security and maintain law and order; deny supplies to the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency; organize intelligence networks; train local militias and instill pride and aggression so that these militias might later function without the Marines; engage in joint patrols with the militias; identify and destroy VC infrastructure; and conduct civic action and propaganda operations.[6] The Marines recognized that in every insurgency the population is subject to terror, force, and other means of coercion by insurgents who strive to secure support; as such, the majority of the population can be expected to side with whoever causes them least trouble or is projected to “come out on top” in the long-run.[7] The Marines were aware that the VC, too, used brutal tactics of “persuasion” and that the cost of providing insufficient security for the population was considerable.

Since the insurgents were often villagers who used their homes as base camps for nightly military excursions and political activities, a primary objective for separating the population from VC propaganda was to establish a day-to-day American presence in the villages, by which the Marines would become a normal and reliable part of the villagers’ lives:

Above all, the Marines would follow through – they would be there, in the same village, day after day, month after month, for one to two years. They would provide a continuing basis for security, for honesty, for determination, and for progress. When the [local militia forces] are able to adequately defend their village, and when the village leader can run the program with enough able help, the Marines will leave.[8]

Reinforced by the security that the Marines provided, the South Vietnamese population’s “goodwill” towards the insurgents appeared to dissipate with time.[9] Having denied the VC access to the villages, the Marines instead became the chief benefactors of the villagers’ intelligence networks and worked to impassion the remaining neutral majority with leadership, military aggressiveness, and esprit de corps.[10] Once a village had been secured and its militia provided rudimentary training, the Marines engaged in combined-platoon patrols, during which the CAPs focused on eliminating VC networks operating within the hamlets.[11] In addition, the Marines engaged in civic action intended to win the support of the population by providing medical, agricultural, educational, and governmental improvements.[12] The longer the Marines stayed and helped the people eliminate VC influence in their area, the more loyalty the locals showed to American forces.[13] The success of early “test cases” eventually yielded CAP’s official integration into the Marine Corps strategy in northern South Vietnam.

The CAP program did not, however, proceed without its share of difficulties and setbacks. Since the average Vietnamese militia fighter was extremely poor – earning far less than his North Vietnamese Army (NVA) counterpart – corruption was widespread.[14] Despite the Marines’ attempts to enact social, political, and economic changes in the villages, the CAP program rarely benefitted from the resources [15] or political backdrop necessary to achieve these goals – essential for compensating VC bribes and threats – both due to the U.S. military’s continued focus on conventional warfare and the rampant corruption that delegitimized and distracted South Vietnam’s government. Throughout the conflict, American military leaders faced the dilemma of wanting to utilize military personnel for village security and the separation of the population from the insurgents, and at the same time worrying about U.S. forces being spread too thin to defend against large-unit NVA and VC attacks.[16]

Another problem that plagued not only the Marines, but the U.S. Army as well, was the high turnover of troops.[17] Although the Marines contemplated several programs aimed at training inexperienced replacements how best to operate in a specific area or village (therefore making the rotation of troops more expeditious and efficient), this issue was never completely resolved.[18] Relationships forged between CAP Marines and villagers during a year-long deployment were often abandoned or had to be started anew by “green” replacements, a reality that damaged the credibility of America’s commitment to the villages and undid hard-won political progress. In the end, resistance to the VC by local militias dissolved after the Americans left for good; militias simply lacked sufficient weapons and supplies, not to mention the confidence derived from fighting alongside a proven, professional fighting force such as the Marines.

Understanding the political factors that hamstrung the success of the CAP program in Vietnam is essential for analyzing the present operations in Afghanistan, where – regardless of the motivation level, particular strategy, or counterinsurgency capabilities of today’s Marine Corps – decisions at the broader political level will continue to shape the outcome of the conflict. For example, while local warlords are funded generously by opium sales or external supporters, the majority of Afghans – like the Vietnamese during that conflict – live in abject poverty, making bribery of militia or politicians an inescapable reality for Marines in the villages. Likewise, massive infusions of cash, weapons, supplies, and fighters from neighboring countries – the insurgency’s logistical arteries, so to speak – present a much wider challenge than can be resolved in village councils, schools, or hospitals. Individual accomplishments by Marines in the Helmand Valley not withstanding, Afghanistan’s factious and militaristic political system complicates the process of organizing a legitimate consensus that is capable of managing counterinsurgency operations countrywide, to say nothing of effecting genuine and lasting socio-political change – dilemmas not unlike those presented by a disjointed and fraudulent American-supported regime in Saigon. Additionally, because the conflict in Afghanistan more closely represents an ongoing multi-faceted civil war rooted in various motivations – rather than the textbook “government vs. those who reject its authority” insurgencies common during the Cold War – coalescing a united front that can pinpoint and address specific insurgent grievances while catering to other factions will be extremely difficult.

From a wider perspective, looming U.S. foreign policy concerns and the possibility of additional entanglements (i.e., Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, international piracy, Central America, as well as larger geopolitical issues such as China and Russia) – threaten to spread thin the American military might available to Afghanistan, in a manner similar to how the determination to wage conventional warfare divided U.S. strategy in Vietnam (much to the detriment of CAP). Additionally – and of principal importance – domestic economic woes, as well as the possibility of increased American casualties from close-quarters fighting in the Helmand Valley (and the disadvantage of limited direct access to reinforcements or air support), will squeeze U.S. policymakers financially and evaporate domestic political support, much as they did during the Vietnam conflict.

For a CAP-like counterinsurgency program to be successful in the Helmand Valley, therefore, the United States must be willing to undertake three major steps: 1) provide weapons and training to Afghan militias whose loyalty and motivations are complex and shifting (much as the U.S. did in the 1980s, and with very same risk that these weapons may be used against American targets); 2) commit to a unified political war-fighting strategy that avoids counterproductive military enticements (i.e., errant missile strikes), regardless of their narrow or potential benefits; and 3) most importantly, make (and keep) a promise to Afghanistan and its neighbors that the U.S. military will maintain troop levels there for several years into the future. As with any counterinsurgency campaign, the principal challenge is to convince the “Afghan people” that, by siding with the United States, they are choosing an ally will continue to deliver on its promises of safety and security in the years – and not just weeks or months – to come.

Combating a traditional and deeply rooted religious movement that is intrinsically at odds with non-believers – rather than a comparably insignificant communist ideology introduced to the Vietnamese only a couple of decades earlier – presents an additional (and substantial) obstacle for the American military, regardless of the achievements of Marines on the battlefield or in local shuras. Avoiding failure will require taking into account and addressing the roles of external powers in the conflict (such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), an approach that necessarily widens and further complicates U.S. foreign policy beyond Afghanistan. Given the historic failure of “big powers” to defeat Afghan insurgencies politically or militarily – and especially given America’s reputation in the region for switching sides at the drop of a hat or pitting its allies against each other – these realities add up to a long and very costly U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Achieving “stability” in Afghanistan and the wider region – however defined – requires a level of U.S. military, political, and economic commitment that will be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.

Endnotes:

1) Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Marines Deploy on Major Mission: Thousands Fan Out in Afghanistan’s South in Crucial Test for Revised U.S. Strategy,” The Washington Post (July 2, 2009). Available online: < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103202_pf.html>.

2) Peter Brush, “The War’s ‘Constructive Component.’” Available online: <http://www.chss.montclair.edu/English/furr/pbvietnam0297.html>.

3) Robert M. Cassidy, “Back To the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam and Other Small Wars,” Parameters (Summer 2004), 76-77.

4) Ibid., 75.

5) Andrew Weist, Essential Histories: The Vietnam War (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 50.

6) David H. Wagner (LTC,USMC), “A Handful of Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1968), 45.

7) James Elliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963, 38-39.

8. F. J. West, Jr., (CPT, USMC), “Fast Rifles,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1967), 38, 43.

9) Brush.

10) Keith F. Kopets (CPT, USMC), “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam.” Military Review (July-August 2002); available from <http://www.Leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug02/kopets.htm>.

11) West, 39.

12) USMC, Professional Knowledge Gained From Operational Experience in Vietnam 1965-1966, 439.

13) Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Boston: Atlantic Monthly

Press, 1986), 174; in Brush.

14) Russell H. Stolfi, U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965 March 1966 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3 Division, HQMC, 1968), 39;

and Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 190-1.

15) Kopets.

16) C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 55.

17) Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 105.

18) USMC, 440

© Copyright 2009 Andrew C. Katen . All rights reserved. The opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of The Daily Clarity, and the article is the unique work of  the contributor.  The copyright in the work belongs to the contributor, other than the specific rights granted to The Daily Clarity, and any permission for reprint or derivative works need to be directed to the author.