The Daily Clarity

A practical strategy for Afghanistan

The more we research Afghanistan and the current NATO strategy, the more we are convinced that the mission objectives are fatally flawed. The West is trying to hoist an ideal of a society – democratic, plurality possessed, centralized- on a nation at best loosely formed. Matthew Hoh, a political officer in the Foreign Service and a senior civilian officer in Zabul  who recently resigned his post over his frustration with the mission gave an enlightening example in a recent interview. He tells of a remote valley, where the tribesmen have a unique language. They traditionally harvest trees from the mountainous slopes and sell them top others. They even use a middleman from outside the valley so they never have to leave. This valley is subsequently “occupied” by NATO troops and Afghan police. The police then inform these tribesmen that these trees they have harvested for generations actually belong to the government in Kabul and they need to pay a tax for their felling. The Taliban rubs their hands in glee as yet another tribe moves into their camp as an expression of opposition to a central Kabul government. NATO would want more boots on the ground to attempt to expand this type of exercise. It is little wonder that President Obama is taking his time to decide the best way forward and for partners like Canada and Australia to beginning planning their exit strategy.

In a powerful article , ‘Don’t try to arrest the sea: An alternative approach for Afghanistan’, written by Pakistani Army Officer, Major Mehar Omar Khan, he makes the point that what we are attempting to do fits firmly in what he terms the ‘can’t do’ basket.

Can’t ‘govern’ this country: It is historically incorrect to call Afghanistan a country or even a place. It has always been and is a people. Afghanistan represents a people who have always been divided and loosely managed; never properly ‘governed’ at any level even in the loosest sense of that word. Any effort to reverse that historical trend or reality will be a terribly misdirected investment of blood and money. Afghans, vastly ignorant as well as illiterate, have never been clever enough to submit to a central authority. ‘Liberal democracy’, ‘united vision’, a ‘social contract’, ‘tolerant co-existence’, ‘civil society’, ‘civil debate’, ‘national discourse’ – are all misnomers largely tossed around in a small section of expatriate community residing in the West. Hence, even the smartest bunch of people can’t govern this place as a whole.

Can’t ‘protect’ all Afghans: The emphasis in the ISAF Counterinsurgency Directive on ‘protecting the civilians, instead of killing the Taliban’ in unachievable in its entirety. Coalition troops can never reach the numbers necessary to extend adequate protection to the populace across Afghanistan. It will only give an additional propaganda tool to the Taliban, in addition to increasing the range of their target zone. Every suicide bombing will now be seen and portrayed as a sign of coalition’s failure to deliver on its ‘promise’ of ‘protecting’ the people. And promises mean a lot in that medieval society. My proposed ‘approach’ addresses this dilemma.

Can’t have ‘total’ peace: In Afghanistan, peace has always been relative – both in time as well as space. In that unfortunate part of the world, ‘peace’ has mostly meant ‘less fighting’ or ‘fighting contained to a few a tribes in a few pockets’ or ‘bloodletting restricted to family feuds’. Afghans are fatally skillful in digging up reasons to fire and fight. No amount of money, time or effort can reverse this tragic historical reality in a space of few years. It will instead take sincere national leadership and international commitment spanning generations – something very hard to come by.

Can’t have ‘rivers of milk and honey’ flowing in a few years: After centuries of war, Afghanistan is now way ‘beyond a quick or economical repair’. Too much is required to be set right and built anew. Roads, hospitals, schools and colleges – nothing is there. Attitudes, dreams,  aspirations,  ideals, sense of unity, and a ‘unifying’ sense of patriotism – again, nothing is there. It’s all broken; shattered by wounds and trauma inflicted by unkind times and endless misery. Brigades of straight-thinking US soldiers with scant support or commitment from Afghan ‘national’ leadership or international community (if there ever were two things by those names) can’t do it in decades, let alone years.

Can’t do it without Pashtuns: Like it or not, Afghanistan has always been a Pashtun country. Many as they are though, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras have always been the ‘outsiders’. Regardless of who holds the banner (the Taliban or anyone else) Pashtuns will never cease fighting unless given their leadership role in Kabul. They have always shed blood for the defense of their ‘right’ on the throne of Kabul. One can’t mess with that ‘right’ without incurring serious consequences. What we are facing in Afghanistan is ‘Pashtun Intifada’. It is only ‘led’ by bearded mullahs calling themselves ‘Taliban’. Take out Taliban and the insurgency will continue.

If one then comprehends that the situation as is, the inability to achieve any measurable success on the current mission objectives becomes clear. Sending more people to do more of the wrong thing is not the answer. At some level, we suspect that the current Obama Administration understands thus, but is caught politically attempting to find a credible way to say no to the military.   It is beyond ironic that what the US Administration is attempting to do in Afghanistan is akin to the policies that are seeing it face Republican anger domestically. Obama has come under savage criticism from a loose amalgam of Republican big tent members about centralized economic planning, fiscal stimulus, state driven enterprise, health service reform, social service groups and on. Domestically, the opposition deems these as to be such complex matters as to be beyond Federal Government and so costly as to push the deficit into previously unknown levels of encumbrance. However, the same groups are willing to spare no dollar to achieve the same objectives in Afghanistan despite their being a barely functional central government, no meaningful economy other than opium trade and no infrastructure to make such reforms practical. Somehow, against the odds of achievement, these military hawks expect to achieve there what they staunchly avow is impossible here, and dang the costs or sacrifices required to make that happen.

So what is achievable? Let us return once again to the recent article of Mehar Omar Khan and see what he thinks is practical

The list is very short. Don’t try to arrest the sea. Create islands. Having gone well past the phase of breaking the back of Al-Qaeda and dispersing the Taliban, concentrate on ‘creating and building’ examples. Set the beacon and you’ll see that all the lost ships and boats will come ashore… Kabul or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will NOT work. Provinces are too big a governance laboratory for Afghanistan. Instead, pick a few districts (nothing more than that) in the heart of areas worst-afflicted by the Taliban-led insurgency. Invest heavily in these districts…

In selected (preferably non-contiguous) districts, give them an honest and polished leadership from ‘amongst themselves’, a transparent and efficient court, a model Pashtun police heavily armed with both weapons and motivation, schools (separate for girls and boys), a few hospitals, electricity, money for farming and setting up small businesses through a few efficiently functioning banks, paved roads, a model transport system and, not the least, build a beautiful grand mosque and an FM station that recites Quran with Pashtu translation 24/7.

A few examples of model districts would unmistakably mean this: that the USA means good and only good; that Islam is not the sole monopoly of Mullah Omar; that Islam and Quran can co-exist with banks and schools and hospitals and businesses; that life without bloodshed is a good life and that what Americans do is better than what Taliban do or plan to do. The approach will give Pashtuns an irresistibly attractive reason to ditch the message and manipulation of the Taliban in addition to stripping Mullah Omar and his Al Qaeda cohorts off their narrative and their manifesto.

Why should we listen to a man such as Mehar Omar Khan in preference to the likes of Rush Limbaugh and Dick Cheney? If we close with his own words as to why the strategy needs to change and quickly, it is clear to us why we need to heed the voice of those with most to lose and not those who simply seek to gain by diminishing others. “No sane citizen of our world, let alone a Pakistani infantry officer who may soon end up being another name on an ever-growing list of the fallen soldiers in the war against terror, enjoys thinking about the painful possibility of our world’s greatest military power and history’s most inspiring nation retreating in the face of an onslaught by Kalashnikov-wielding bearded barbarians riding on the back of motorcycles, hungry horses and perspiring mules.” Rarely are more true words on Afghanistan presented for our review. They are words we should weigh carefully and heavily, and make sure we make the right decisions not necessarily just the fastest.