Iraq and the radicalization of Anwar al-Awlaki
If you know Anwar al-Awlaki’s name, it is probably in relation to the recent tragic murders at Fort Hood. The murder of 13 soldiers by Major Nidal Malik Hasan drove another wedge deeper and harder between an already traumatized US population and the religion of Islam. Hasan had exchanged dozens of emails with cleric al-Awlaki, and his radicalized teachings are thought to have further agitated Hasan ; an individual who already seemed to have only a tenuous grasp on the realities of his existence. Awlaki’s influence on the Western- recruited jihadists is well-known and documented.
Al-Awlaki’s sermons have turned up on the computers of nearly every homegrown terror suspect arrested in the United States…
Members of a group of Canadian Muslims arrested in 2006 for allegedly forming a training camp and plotting bombing attacks in Toronto listened to his online calls for jihad, according to the case against them in court. According to prosecutors, an al-Awlaki sermon on jihad was among the numerous materials – including videos of beheadings – found on the computers of five men convicted in December of plotting attacks on the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey.
On his Web site and in widely circulated lectures, the 38-year-old al-Awlaki, now in hiding in Yemen, often calls on Muslims to fight against the United States, accusing it of waging war on Islam in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Nidal Hasan, who has been charged in the Fort Hood shootings, contacted al-Awlaki nearly a year ago. In an interview published in The Washington Post, al-Awlaki said he did not pressure Hasan to carry out the shooting, but after the attack, al-Awlaki praised him as a hero. U.S. investigators have said Hasan appears to have acted alone, not on orders from anyone, when he opened fire Nov. 5 at the Texas military base, killing 13.
The cleric met two of the 9/11 hijackers at mosques where he preached in the United States, and after his return to Yemen he was detained for more than a year on suspicion of involvement in a kidnapping gang. Yemeni officials released him because they could not confirm an al-Qaida link, but they say they are hunting for him again on suspicion he may have ties.
So how does a Western educated man like al-Awlaki suddenly become a vitriolic advocate of Jihad, and an arch enemy of the West? His story is not that unusual. Al-Awlaki began his religious preaching at the Rabat Mosque in San Diego, California. Sometime in 2001, Al-Awlaki moved to Virginia; he spent time in the UK in 2002 before returning to Virginia, and finally he moved to Yemen in 2004. It was the events of 2001-2002 that saw al-Awlaki move from passionate believer to a recruiter of young Muslims to Jihad. Prior to this, al-Awlaki was actually a target of more radical jihadist Imans who had called for al-Awlaki to be killed for his tolerance and moderation of non-Muslims (Kuffirs).
In 2001, one of the most English speaking radical clerics, al-Faisal, singled out al-Awlaki and his teachings in San Diego as the antithesis of Jihad, and implied that he should be nurdered for his moderate positions.
Al-Faisal’s lecture on al-Awlaki is listed as “CIA Islam – Sheikh Faisal’s Takfeer of Anwar Awlaki” on www.archive.org. On the recording, Faisal explains that his lecture is about a preacher named “Anwar” from the Masjid al-Rabat in San Diego. He then proceeds to play sections of Awlaki’s lecture for his audience before refuting its points. The voice on the tape seems to be that of Anwar al-Awlaki.
Al-Faisal’s complaint about al-Awlaki is basically twofold: First, that al-Awlaki’s criteria for declaring takfir was overly restrictive—someone would have to directly refute the Quran or blatantly denounce central tenets of Islam in order to receive that designation. And, second, that al-Awlaki argued that only God should judge Muslims. Al-Faisal argues that this non-judgmental understanding of Islam is pushed by the CIA in order to limit violent activism.
The issue of judgment resonates deeply for al-Faisal. After playing a portion of the lecture in which al-Awlaki declares, “we do not judge the people…we leave that for Allah,” al-Faisal pointedly asks his audience, “Do you agree with that, brothers?”
After the audience grumbles in response, Faisal prompts them again, “I can’t hear you!” and then asks, “What should we do with him?” Referring to al-Awlaki, someone in the audience replies, “Kill him, brother, kill him.” To hammer home the point, al-Faisal affirms, “The brother said ‘kill him.”
Later, speaking rhetorically to al-Awlaki, al-Faisal exclaims, “Did you realize that when you opened your mouth and said ‘we are not here to judge’ you became worse than the kuffar?… You have become the lowest of the low.”
…Al-Faisal’s complaint about al-Awlaki is basically twofold: First, that al-Awlaki’s criteria for declaring takfir was overly restrictive—someone would have to directly refute the Quran or blatantly denounce central tenets of Islam in order to receive that designation. And, second, that al-Awlaki argued that only God should judge Muslims. Al-Faisal argues that this non-judgmental understanding of Islam is pushed by the CIA in order to limit violent activism.
It is difficult to reconcile the al-Awlaki of this period with the Jihadi-inspiring radicalized cleric of today. What radicalized al-Awlaki was not even the September 11 bombing. It appears what created such an enemy for the West was the invasion of Iraq, which al-Awlaki saw as unwarranted and a direct attack on Muslim. In statements in a February 13, 2004 interview with National Public Radio, pressed about the role of Muslims in the West after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, al-Awlaki condemned 9/11 strongly but explained that “after the bombing (the invasion of Iraq)…the conversation shifted…Muslims are torn between solidarity with their religious fellowmen and their fellow citizens.”
It was the decision to invade Iraq that produced the Jihadist cleric that we see today. If ever there is tangible proof of the strategic error of the decision to invade Iraq and the terrible consequences the US faced as a result, it is in the conversion of a moderate cleric despised by other radicalized clerics, to the arch recruiter of Western based Jihadists today. That is a hard cost of a strategic error of a lack of understanding of the region. To quote Brian Fishman, a former director of research at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center , “ …[this} should be one of the lessons that comes out of the terrible tragedy at Fort Hood—not just that we need to identify the Nidal Hasans of the world (which we do), but that the Anwar al-Awlakis of the world face ideological and personal crises of their own. When jihadis make enemies of one another, that’s when it is time for counterterrorism professionals to make allies.” Never were wiser words spoken.
How wide spread is the radicalization of the messages being pumped out to Western Muslims, and how urgently does the West need to adapt its own strategy as Brian Fishamn suggests? Let’s close with a sobering AP report, which now identifies at least 200 sites promoting Jihad content to English speaking Muslims:
U.S. intelligence officials declined comment on the spread of English-language jihadist Web sites.
Such sites are expected to follow closely the upcoming trials of Hasan and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is accused of being a top architect of the 9/11 attacks, said Rita Katz, head of the U.S. based SITE Intelligence Group, which follows on line militant traffic. The Obama administration announced this week that Mohammed and four others will be put on trial in New York City.
Almushawah said clerics like al-Awlaki are “more dangerous than any other group.” And if these clerics are jailed, “it’s no big loss for al-Qaida because they don’t belong to the network,” he said.
Many of the sites post speeches by English-speaking clerics like al-Awlaki or, more often, translations of sermons and lectures by Arabic-speaking clerics.
One site, the Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad links to sermons by al-Awlaki, alongside English versions of speeches by some of the top sheikhs of jihadist ideology – even some who are dead like Abdullah Azzam.
The proliferation of sites in English means “potential jihadists can know only their native language and still be radicalized,” Katz said.
While al-Awlaki has become popular, “other, more prominent and influential Arabic-speaking jihadist sheikhs … have had their works and speeches translated into English and other languages. Their works tend to be used more often by the jihadist community to justify violence,” she said in an e-mail interview. Al-Awlaki “fills a void in that he can directly interact, understand and communicate with English-speaking jihadists in a way that Arabic-speaking clerics cannot.”
Almushawah says most of the servers for the sites are in Britain, but they can be run from anywhere and most of them are operated and receive content from the U.S. Most of the clerics who appear on them are in the Arab world with some in France and England.
U.S. intelligence officials declined to comment on the spread of English language sites and their influence.
Saudi Arabia set up its Assakeena program after authorities found that 70 percent of al-Qaida sympathizers were drawn to the group through the Internet. In the campaign, government-backed preachers monitor 400 radical Islamic web sites and inject a more moderate message on the sites.
The campaigners also directly contact and dialogue with militants they encounter on the Web, conversations that can take weeks or months. Of 2,631 militants contacted by the group, 1,170 withdrew their support for radicals, according to the campaign. About a fifth of the militants were from Europe and North American, and the rest from Arab countries.
Assakeena – the name is Arabic for “Tranquility from God” – is part of other hearts-and-minds programs the kingdom launched to complement its crackdown on al-Qaida after the group carried out a series of attacks on foreigners and oil infrastructure in 2004.
AP News : 200 Web sites spread al-Qaida’s message in English
