How virtual Internet Jihad can become real
There is a very active “real” world of jihad on the Internet, at least for the participants. The blogs, bulletin boards are active, virulent and pervasive. The authorities hunt these sites in a game of cat and mouse, but as fast as they are blocked another version springs to life on a different server and the philosophy of jihad has its own channel again. Like many political “communities” on the Internet, it is assumed that these sites attract their fair share of religious blowhards and “wanna-be’s”, but sometimes what happens in the virtual world can cross over into the actual one.
Take the case of the suicide bomber, Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, who recently detonated himself to devastating effect with the resultant deaths of many CIA operatives in Khost. Abu Dujana was something of a darling on the jihad forums. and many of his beliefs were expressed there. He has become a hero in both the world of the virtual and real jihadist.
The jihadi forums are in a frenzy today over breaking news that one of their own may have been the suicide bomber that killed seven CIA employees in Khost, Afghanistan on December 30, 2009. First reported by al-Jazeera yesterday, and picked up in the Wall Street Journal today, it appears that a spokesperson of the Pakistani Taliban has claimed that the suicide bomber at Forward Operating Base Chapman was Jordanian national Hammam Khalil Abu Milal, famous in the jihadi blogosphere as Abu Dujana al-Khurasani. If true, this news is sure to galvanize the online jihadi community, and would represent the most dramatic case to date of the potential for virtual-to-actual jihadi activism.
Even before his alleged role in the Khost attack, Abu Dujana was well known to jihadis for having made the transition from keyboard to Kalashnikov earlier last year. He quickly rose to prominence – and eventually an adminstrator position – on the elite al-Hisba forum in 2007, and has long been widely regarded for a series of popular essays he wrote on the forums, especially on the course of the jihad in Iraq and in praise of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. In September of 2009, it was announced on the forums that Abu Dujana had joined the mujahidin in “Khurasan” (Afghanistan and western Pakistan), and the al-Qa’ida magazine “Vanguards of Khurasan” ran an interview with Abu Dujana about his jihadi career that same month in its fifteenth issue. Another famous cyber-jihadi and former Hisba admin, Ziad Abu Tariq, posted a glowing encomium to Abu Dujana soon thereafter. In October, a compilation of his essays was produced in high-quality pdf format and distributed on the forums, an extremely unusual mark of distinction for an e-jihadi with otherwise no religious or military credentials.
Abu Dujana is just another example of how an educated man can be radicalized, and join the jihad as a result of anger and frustration. It also shows that threats made in the virtual world can and should be taken seriously. The anonymous poster on the Internet may have more serious intent than any casual reader would think. It also acts as a stark reminder that the foreign policies of the West do have concrete effect. Hate usually has a spark, but it appears it is often transmitted and flamed via the Internet across borders, time zone and language.
It is worthwhile to remember the case of the murder of 13 soldiers by Major Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood. Hasan had exchanged dozens of emails jihadi cleric al-Awlaki, another infamous Internet jihadiist rallying point. His radicalized teachings distributed through internet and email are thought to have further agitated Hasan. Awlaki’s influence on the Western- recruited jihadists is well-known and documented. Eventhough it is suspected he died in a recent drone strike, his teachings still exist in the ether:
Al-Awlaki began his religious preaching at the Rabat Mosque in San Diego, California. Sometime in 2001, Al-Awlaki moved to Virginia; he spent time in the UK in 2002 before returning to Virginia, and finally he moved to Yemen in 2004. It was the events of 2001-2002 that saw al-Awlaki move from passionate believer to a recruiter of young Muslims to Jihad. Prior to this, al-Awlaki was actually a target of more radical jihadist Imans who had called for al-Awlaki to be killed for his tolerance and moderation of non-Muslims (Kuffirs). Remember it was only in in 2001 that one of the most English speaking radical clerics, al-Faisal, singled out al-Awlaki and his teachings as the antithesis of Jihad, and implied that perhaps he should be murdered for his moderate positions.
Al-Faisal’s lecture on al-Awlaki is listed as “CIA Islam – Sheikh Faisal’s Takfeer of Anwar Awlaki” on www.archive.org. On the recording, Faisal explains that his lecture is about a preacher named “Anwar” from the Masjid al-Rabat in San Diego. He then proceeds to play sections of Awlaki’s lecture for his audience before refuting its points. The voice on the tape seems to be that of Anwar al-Awlaki.
Al-Faisal’s complaint about al-Awlaki is basically twofold: First, that al-Awlaki’s criteria for declaring takfir was overly restrictive—someone would have to directly refute the Quran or blatantly denounce central tenets of Islam in order to receive that designation. And, second, that al-Awlaki argued that only God should judge Muslims. Al-Faisal argues that this non-judgmental understanding of Islam is pushed by the CIA in order to limit violent activism.
The issue of judgment resonates deeply for al-Faisal. After playing a portion of the lecture in which al-Awlaki declares, “we do not judge the people…we leave that for Allah,” al-Faisal pointedly asks his audience, “Do you agree with that, brothers?”
After the audience grumbles in response, Faisal prompts them again, “I can’t hear you!” and then asks, “What should we do with him?” Referring to al-Awlaki, someone in the audience replies, “Kill him, brother, kill him.” To hammer home the point, al-Faisal affirms, “The brother said ‘kill him.”
Later, speaking rhetorically to al-Awlaki, al-Faisal exclaims, “Did you realize that when you opened your mouth and said ‘we are not here to judge’ you became worse than the kuffar?… You have become the lowest of the low.”
…Al-Faisal’s complaint about al-Awlaki is basically twofold: First, that al-Awlaki’s criteria for declaring takfir was overly restrictive—someone would have to directly refute the Quran or blatantly denounce central tenets of Islam in order to receive that designation. And, second, that al-Awlaki argued that only God should judge Muslims. Al-Faisal argues that this non-judgmental understanding of Islam is pushed by the CIA in order to limit violent activism.
It is difficult to reconcile the al-Awlaki of this period with the Jihadi-inspiring radicalized cleric he became. What radicalized al-Awlaki was not even the September 11 bombing. It appears what created such an enemy for the West was the invasion of Iraq, which al-Awlaki saw as an unwarranted, direct attack on Muslims. In a 2004 interview with National Public Radio, pressed about the role of Muslims in the West after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, al-Awlaki condemned 9/11 strongly but explained that “after the bombing (the invasion of Iraq)…the conversation shifted…Muslims are torn between solidarity with their religious fellowmen and their fellow citizens.”
It was the decision to invade Iraq that produced the Jihadist cleric that we see today. If ever there is tangible proof of the strategic error of the decision to invade Iraq and the terrible consequences the US faced as a result, it is in the conversion of a moderate cleric despised by other radicalized clerics, to the arch recruiter of Western based Jihadists today. That is a hard cost of a strategic error of a lack of understanding of the region. To quote Brian Fishman, a former director of research at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center , “ …[this} should be one of the lessons that comes out of the terrible tragedy at Fort Hood—not just that we need to identify the Nidal Hasans of the world (which we do), but that the Anwar al-Awlakis of the world face ideological and personal crises of their own. When jihadis make enemies of one another, that’s when it is time for counterterrorism professionals to make allies.” Never were wiser words spoken.
How wide spread is the radicalization of the messages being pumped out to Western Muslims, and how urgently does the West need to adapt its own strategy as Brian Fishamn suggests? How much notice does the West need to take of the virtual Jihadists? Let’s close with a sobering AP report, which now identifies at least 200 sites promoting Jihad content to English speaking Muslims:
U.S. intelligence officials declined comment on the spread of English-language jihadist Web sites.
Such sites are expected to follow closely the upcoming trials of Hasan and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is accused of being a top architect of the 9/11 attacks, said Rita Katz, head of the U.S. based SITE Intelligence Group, which follows on line militant traffic. The Obama administration announced this week that Mohammed and four others will be put on trial in New York City.
Almushawah said clerics like al-Awlaki are “more dangerous than any other group.” And if these clerics are jailed, “it’s no big loss for al-Qaida because they don’t belong to the network,” he said.
Many of the sites post speeches by English-speaking clerics like al-Awlaki or, more often, translations of sermons and lectures by Arabic-speaking clerics.
One site, the Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad links to sermons by al-Awlaki, alongside English versions of speeches by some of the top sheikhs of jihadist ideology – even some who are dead like Abdullah Azzam.
The proliferation of sites in English means “potential jihadists can know only their native language and still be radicalized,” Katz said.
While al-Awlaki has become popular, “other, more prominent and influential Arabic-speaking jihadist sheikhs … have had their works and speeches translated into English and other languages. Their works tend to be used more often by the jihadist community to justify violence,” she said in an e-mail interview. Al-Awlaki “fills a void in that he can directly interact, understand and communicate with English-speaking jihadists in a way that Arabic-speaking clerics cannot.”
Almushawah says most of the servers for the sites are in Britain, but they can be run from anywhere and most of them are operated and receive content from the U.S. Most of the clerics who appear on them are in the Arab world with some in France and England.
U.S. intelligence officials declined to comment on the spread of English language sites and their influence.
Saudi Arabia set up its Assakeena program after authorities found that 70 percent of al-Qaida sympathizers were drawn to the group through the Internet. In the campaign, government-backed preachers monitor 400 radical Islamic web sites and inject a more moderate message on the sites.
The campaigners also directly contact and dialogue with militants they encounter on the Web, conversations that can take weeks or months. Of 2,631 militants contacted by the group, 1,170 withdrew their support for radicals, according to the campaign. About a fifth of the militants were from Europe and North American, and the rest from Arab countries.
Assakeena – the name is Arabic for “Tranquility from God” – is part of other hearts-and-minds programs the kingdom launched to complement its crackdown on al-Qaida after the group carried out a series of attacks on foreigners and oil infrastructure in 2004.
AP News : 200 Web sites spread al-Qaida’s message in English
